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Selective Enforcement of Land Regulations: Why Land-use Violations Persist in 
China?1  
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Despite the government’s decades-long enforcement efforts, violations of land laws and 
regulations remain a serious problem in China. Local governments have often been blamed. 
This article identifies a previously overlooked reason for large-scale violations by focusing 
on the enforcement behavior of the central government. It argues that the central government 
enforces land regulations selectively: the strength of enforcement depends on the violators’ 
political status. Drawing on a case study based on the national policy prohibiting new golf 
course construction, the article finds that golf course developers connected with high-level 
political elites are more likely to violate the prohibition and survive the subsequent 
enforcement actions by the central government. This finding contributes to the literature of 
regulatory enforcement in authoritarian regimes and has broad implications for reforms in 
China. 																																																																		
1 For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Mayling Birney, Georgia Kernell, Pierre Landry, Tse-Kang 
Leng, Victor Shih, Andrew Wedeman, two anonymous reviewers, and the editors of the China Journal. I also 
thank the participants at the 2013 annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, the 2013 annual meeting 
of the Midwest Political Science Association, and the 2013 annual meeting of the American Association for 
Chinese Studies. Financial support for this study was provided by the Equality Development and Globalization 
Studies (EDGS) program at Northwestern University and the China Times Cultural Foundation. Of course, I am 
responsible for all errors.   
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“All golf courses built after 2004 are illegal.”2 
      
     ———— Gan Zangchun, Vice Supervisor of National Land 
 
“Large firms should stand more rigorous examination, whether they are domestic or foreign 
and regardless of their ownership… as long as firms violate laws and regulations, they are 
wrong. Whether the violations are large or small, they must be punished.”3 
 
     ———— Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) 
 
After nearly two decades of rapid urbanization and booming real estate development, illegal 
land use has become a serious governance problem in China. According to official statistics, 
tens to hundreds of thousands of hectares of land have been occupied and developed every 
year in ways that do not conform to national laws and regulations.4 The negative 
consequences of illegal land use are serious: it reduces the quantity and quality of arable land, 
poses threats to national food security and the environment, and causes massive social unrest. 
Land disputes are estimated to account for thousands of violent mass protests every year, and 
have replaced rural taxes and fees to become the single largest source of social instability.5 
Both scholars and government officials have repeatedly warned that illegal land use is 
enormously deleterious to the economic and social development of China as well as to the 
legitimacy of the government and the Chinese Communist Party.   
 As a response, the Party and central government have adopted several administrative and 
political measures to strengthen the enforcement of land laws and regulations. Since 1998, 
the central government has gradually centralized its authority over land management and has 																																																																		
2 China News, April 19, 2011, “Ministry of Land and Resources: Any New Golf Course is Illegal.” Available at 
http://www.chinanews.com/estate/2011/04-19/2983955.shtml?finance=2. 
3 People’s Daily, April 15, 2013, “Large Firms should Stand More Rigorous Examination.” Available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqgj/jryw/2013-04-15/content_8757489.html. 
4 National Land and Resource Yearbooks, 2000-2012. 
5 Jianrong Yu, “Major Types and Basic Characteristics of Group Events in Today's China,” Journal of the 
University of Chinese Administrative Law, no. 6 (2009). 
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conducted several reforms to streamline the land administration system.6 In particular, it 
established the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR hereafter) and significantly expanded 
its authority vis-à-vis other government entities regarding land use issues. Through the 
reformed system, the central government began to adopt the so-called “strictest land 
management institutions”.7 The central government also strengthened its oversight capacity 
by establishing the Supervisor of State Land, a special unit within MLR. The Supervisor 
relies on satellite technology and inspection tours to monitor land-use activities and detect 
violations. These administrative measures are backed by harsher penalties, both political and 
criminal, for illegal activities. Between 2006 and 2011, more than 35,000 cases of illegal land 
use were disclosed and reportedly rectified, and 8,500 officials at various levels were 
punished.8  
 The strengthened enforcement efforts and harsher punishments have produced mixed 
outcomes. While the total number of disclosed land-use violations has steadily declined 
between 1999 and 2011 (see solid line in Fig.1),9 their severity measured by the average size 
of the illegal land use cases more than tripled over the same period (see line of dashes in 
Fig.1). As a result, the total area of land illegally occupied and developed in the country 
remains worryingly large, and this remains a major concern of the government as well as a 
focus of public attention. Figure 2 describes the pattern of the number of articles that contain 
																																																																		
6 For a comprehensive discussion on the central government’s reforms of the land administration system, see 
George Lin, Developing China: Land, Politics and Social Conditions, (London; New York: Routledge, 2009).	
7 The State Council, 2004, “Decision of the State Council on Deepening Reform and Strengthening Land 
Administration.” 
8 Legal Daily, October 20, 2011, available at: http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/1021/c1026-19333005.html.  
9 It should be noted these numbers are based on government statistics and do not include undisclosed illegal 
land use, so the figures underestimate the true incidence of illegal land use. Also these numbers may be subject 
to political manipulation for various reasons..   
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the term “land-use violations (tudi weifa)” in People’s Daily and Legal Daily, two major 
official newspapers in China. The figure shows that, after a brief period of decline during the 
2008 global financial crisis, media coverage on illegal land use quickly rebounded.10 As a 
leading official of the MLR acknowledged, “land-use violations remain a salient problem in 
the land and resource area”.11      
(Figure 1 and 2 about here.) 
 This article seeks to explain the persistent lack of effectiveness in the enforcement of 
land regulations. Unlike most existing accounts that too frequently focus on the 
noncompliance of local authorities, this study pays greater attention to the regulatory 
behavior of the central government. I argue that one previously underexplored reason for 
uncontained illegal land use is that regulators, even those in the central government, tend to 
enforce land laws and regulations in a selective manner: they target non-compliance, carry 
out enforcement actions, and impose punishment selectively based on violators’ political 
status. More specifically, I argue that firms with high-level political connections are more 
likely to violate land regulations and influence the enforcement efforts of the central 
government. 
 To be sure, illegal land use activities do not always involve actors with high-level 
political connections; neither can they all attract the attention of regulators in the central 
government. Rather, a majority of them are relatively small in scale and involve local 
																																																																		
10 One reason for the decline of media coverage (and probably also the actual incidence) of land use violations 
during the crisis period is that, in order to maintain economic growth, the Chinese government launched a giant 
stimulus plan and loosened the enforcement of many land regulations.    
11 Li Jianqin, 2011, “Violations of Laws and Regulations Remain a Salient Problem in the Land and Resource 
Area”, available at: http://www.mlr.gov.cn/wszb/2010_gpdb/zhibozhaiyao/201101/t20110120_812987.htm 
accessed February 5, 2013. 
		 	
5 		
political and business interests only. However, large-scale violations are worth special 
attention for two reasons. First, inasmuch as they often involve the occupation of large 
amounts of land, they are more likely to cause discontent and disputes, therefore posing a 
more serious threat to social stability. Second, as discussed later, larger violations are 
relatively easier to detect, and therefore should be easier to monitor and regulate from a 
technical point of view. The government’s failure to prevent such violations thus can provide 
important insight into the politics of the enforcement of land laws and regulations in China. 
 I will test my argument by analyzing a national policy that prohibited the construction of 
golf courses since 2004. Despite the government’s repeated efforts to strengthen the 
enforcement, violations of the prohibition remain prevalent. Thus, the case of golf courses 
constitutes a microcosm for illegal land use in China. Additionally, examining the case of 
golf courses has an empirical advantage: it allows me to accurately identify land-use 
violations and observe their enforcement outcomes. Combining regression analysis and case 
studies, I will provide evidence for the selective enforcement behavior of the central 
government. First, I collected data on golf course development for a sample of 50 largest real 
estate developers publicly traded in Chinese stock markets. Using regressions, I find that 
firms with higher-level political connections are more likely to build illegal golf courses, 
suggesting that the prohibition has a weaker deterrent effect on such firms. Second, I analyze 
seven illegal golf courses that were disclosed by the media and then investigated by the 
central government as “top priority cases” (guapai duban anjian). A close examination of 
these cases based on hundreds of media reports and more than 30 personal interviews, 
primarily with local officials and businessmen and employees in the real estate industry, 
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shows that central or provincial-level political elites indeed provide various kinds of support 
and protection for illegal land use projects.  
 Scholars have noted that government leaders in democratic political systems often 
manipulate regulatory processes to serve distributive or redistributive purposes. The logic is 
that political pressure from voters and interest groups prompts elected politicians to intervene 
in the functioning of regulatory agencies.12 In contrast, research that examines the effects of 
distributive politics on regulatory enforcement is relatively scarce in non-electoral 
authoritarian regimes. One reason is that it is often assumed that authoritarian regimes like 
China, due to political centralization, enjoy a greater degree of policy autonomy and a 
stronger enforcement capacity.13 A second reason for this dearth of research is that reliable 
systematic data on the enforcement of government regulations are often absent in 
non-democratic contexts. This paper has developed such data, and using China as a case, is 
able to demonstrate the enforcement impact of distributive politics in an authoritarian regime.   
 Existing studies on the impediments to effective governance in China have focused on 
the lack of information by the regulators, the fragmented administrative system, and 
non-compliance or resistance by local officials.14 Under a decentralized administrative 
structure with multiple layers of authorities, local officials often disobey central government 																																																																		
12 Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994). 
13 Olivier Blanchard and Andrei Shleifer, "Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China Versus 
Russia," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 7616 (2000); Augustin Kwasi Fosu, 
Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013).	
14 Martin K. Dimitrov, Piracy and the State: The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); Margaret M. Pearson, “The Business of Governing Business in China: 
Institutions and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State,” World Politics 57, no. 2 (2005); “Governing the 
Chinese Economy: Regulatory Reform in the Service of the State,” Public Administration Review 67, no. 4 
(2007); Tim Wright, “The Political Economy of Coal Mine Disasters in China: Your Rice Bowl or Your Life,” 
The China Quarterly, no. 179 (2004). 
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policies in pursuit of individual and/or collective local interests.15 A dominant view in the 
literature on land politics, for example, portrays land requisition and resulting conflicts as a 
process of contestation between local governments and dispossessed residents, and attributes 
local officials’ illicit requisitioning of land to their imperative to seek extra-budgetary 
revenues or promote local economic development.16 This view correctly identifies the local 
conflicts of interest among various parties surrounding the use of land, but downplays the 
behavior of the central government as the regulator and enforcer. This article finds that local 
officials are by no means the only culprits behind illegal land use practices. Regulators in the 
central government may also tolerate illegal land use activities for their own purposes.     
The Politics of Land Regulation Enforcement in China 
Enforcement is costly, because governments need sufficient administrative and fiscal 
resources to enforce laws and regulations. The conventional wisdom on law and regulation 
enforcement assumes that non-enforcement reflects weak state capacity.17 Following this 
logic, scholars of comparative politics have examined the enforcement impacts of weak state 
capacity, incompetent government agencies, and weak bureaucratic control in various 
contexts.18 Jonathan Schwartz applies this line of reasoning to China and finds that state 
																																																																		
15 Ting Gong and Alfred M. Wu, "Central Mandates in Flux: Local Noncompliance in China," Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism 42, no. 2 (2012); Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "Selective Policy Implementation in 
Rural China," Comparative Politics 31, no. 2 (1999); Andrew Wedeman, From Mao to Market: Rent Seeking, 
Local Protectionism, and Marketization in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).	
16 For example, see Sally Sargeson, "The Politics of Land Development in Urbanizing China," The China 
Journal, no. 66 (2011); Meg Rithmire, "Land Politics and Local State Capacities: The Political Economy of 
Urban Change in China," The China Quarterly 216(2013); Yongshun Cai, "Collective Ownership or Cadres' 
Ownership? The Non-Agricultural Use of Farmland in China," ibid.175(2003); You-tien Hsing, "Land and 
Territorial Politics in Urban China," ibid., no. 187 (2006). 
17 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third 
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
18 Sandra F. Joireman, "Enforcing New Property Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Ugandan Constitution and 
the 1998 Land Act," Comparative Politics 39, no. 4 (2007); Nicolas Van de Walle, African Economies and the 
Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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capacity—defined as a combination of human capital, fiscal strength, and the reach of the 
state apparatus—plays a key role in explaining the regional variations in the enforcement of 
environmental policy.19  
 Enforcement may also incur political costs.20 Political imperatives, especially to garner 
political support from key constituencies, often motivate government leaders to intervene in 
the functioning of regulatory agencies.21 To address this problem, most developed countries 
have introduced independent regulatory agencies in key policy areas. Even so, government 
leaders’ political concerns may exert an influence on enforcement. For example, using data 
from the U.S. taxation agency, the Internal Revenue Service, researchers have found that the 
proportion of individual income tax returns audited is lower for electoral districts that are 
more important to the president.22 When regulatory enforcement is not by way of 
independent agencies, intervention is all the easier. Political favoritism in the enforcement of 
environmental regulations in Brazilian cities is more evident in election years, especially 
when the incumbent mayor faces stiffer electoral competition.23 Data from three Latin 
American cities show that mayors who rely on rich and middle-class constituencies conduct 
more enforcement operations against poor street vendors than do mayors who rely on poorer 
constituencies.24  																																																																		
19 Jonathan Schwartz, "The Impact of State Capacity on Enforcement of Environmental Policies: The Case of 
China," The Journal of Environment & Development 12, no. 1 (2003). 
20 Robert A. Kagan, "Editor's Introduction: Understanding Regulatory Enforcement," Law & Policy 11, no. 2 
(1989). 
21 Navroz K. Dubash and Bronwen Morgan, "Understanding the Rise of the Regulatory State of the South," 
Regulation & Governance 6, no. 3 (2012); Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin 
America. 
22 Marilyn Young, Michael Reksulak, and William F. Shughart, "The Political Economy of the I.R.S," 
Economics & Politics 13, no. 2 (2001). 
23 Claudio Ferraz, "Electoral Politics and Bureaucratic Discretion: Evidence from Environmental Licenses and 
Local Elections in Brazil," (Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada, 2007). 
24 Alisha Holland, “The Distributive Politics of Enforcement,” American Journal of Political Science, 
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 The literature on distributive politics and enforcement primarily focuses on democracies, 
as elected politicians are often regarded as facing stronger distributive pressures than their 
non-elected counterparts.25 Nevertheless, authoritarian leaders also seek to maintain the 
support of crucial domestic actors, especially the “selectorate”: i.e., the group within the 
political elite who are able to influence leadership selection.26 As with other authoritarian 
rulers, Chinese leaders are never immune to challenges from regime insiders. For them, 
political survival is a constant concern. Over the reform decades, elite struggles have led to 
the downfall of two General Party Secretaries and a number of other senior officials. 
Compared with their predecessors, more recent leaders face an even more uncertain political 
environment, due to their relatively weak personal authority and the declining discipline of 
the Party.28 To be sure, regime leaders can reduce political uncertainty by purging disloyal 
officials and promoting those they trust, thereby changing the composition of the selectorate 
in their own favor.29 However, their ability to do so is limited, since ambitious power plays 
often trigger collective resistance from other members of the elite to whom this poses a 
threat.30  
 Concerned about political survival, authoritarian leaders must share the spoils of office 
																																																																																																																																																																																																								
forthcoming.  
25 Miriam Golden and Brian Min, "Distributive Politics around the World," Annual Review of Political Science 
16, no. 1 (2013).	
26 Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993); Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," 
Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 11 (2007); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The Logic of Political Survival 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003). 
28 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
29 Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu, "Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the 
Advancement of Central Committee Members in China," American Political Science Review, 106, no. 1 (2012). 
30 Milan W. Svolik, "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," American Journal of 
Political Science 53, no. 2 (2009); Ronald Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship (Cambridge, UK ; 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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with other sectors of the political elite to maintain their loyalty.31 A common rent-sharing 
strategy is the use of distributive institutions and policies, ranging from the direct allocation 
of fiscal funds and public employment to more delicately designed industrial and monetary 
policies.32 For example, a landmark analysis of the agricultural policy in Africa suggests that 
African leaders manipulated the markets of agricultural products to favor their core 
supporters in urban sectors and within state bureaucracies.33 Indonesia under Suharto’s rule 
stubbornly maintained capital account openness during the 1997 Asian financial crisis to 
protect the interests of those mobile-capital owners who were important members of 
Suharto’s ruling coalition.34 In Malaysia, the New Economic Policy characterized by strong 
state interventions in the economy has long been criticized for having created numerous 
rent-seeking opportunities for powerful members of the regime and firms connected to 
them.35 
 Although law and regulation enforcement is rarely considered a distributive policy, it 
often has distributive impacts. In particular, how laws and regulations are enforced may 
affect the distribution of rents available to members of the political elite and their business 
partners and incur a potential political cost for authoritarian leaders. Connections between 
political elites and business interests are ubiquitous in developing countries, including 																																																																		
31 Beatriz Magaloni, "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule," Comparative Political 
Studies 41, no. 4-5 (2008); Svolik, "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes; 
Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship. 
32 Leonard R. Arriola, "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa," Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 10 
(2009). Lisa Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011); Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
33 Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agriculatural Policies 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). 
34 Thomas B. Pepinsky, Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and 
Malaysia in Comparative Perspective (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
35 Edmund Terence Gomez and K. S. Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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China.36 Scholars have long noticed the increasing conjoining of wealth and power in China. 
For example, in Red Capitalism, Charles Walter and Fraser Howie describe the Chinese 
economy as a “family business”, in which special interest groups led by families of political 
elites are commonplace.37 This leads some scholars to warn that rent seeking by political 
elites has “trapped” further political and economic transition in China.38   
 Connections between business interests and political elites may take a variety of forms, 
with two most representative in the Chinese context. The first is that many firms in China are 
owned by the central or local states. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inherently embedded 
in the Chinese political system. Their leading managers are state officials with administrative 
ranks. Some SOE managers are full or alternate members of the Central Committee of the 
Party, or delegates to legislative bodies at national and subnational levels. In addition, the 
frequent rotation of officials between SOEs and the government further strengthens the 
existing ties between SOEs and the ministries responsible for their supervision.39 These 
formal and informal ties provide SOEs with significant preferential treatments such as bank 
loans as well as privileges in the implementation of government policy.40 For example, a 
recent study has shown that cities dominated by large SOE firms have a poorer record in the 
implementation of central government policies designed to enhance environmental 																																																																		
36 Raymond Fisman, "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," The American Economic Review 91, no. 
4 (2001); Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Atif Mian, "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in 
an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, no. 4 (2005); Hongbin Li et al., 
"Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms," Journal of 
Development Economics 87, no. 2 (2008).	
37 Carl E. Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie, Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China's 
Extraordinary Rise (Singapore: Wiley, 2011). 
38 Minxin Pei, China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2006). 
39 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?,” The China 
Quarterly 211(2012). 
40 Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
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transparency.41   
 Unlike SOEs that hold formal positions within the Chinese political system, private firms 
generally have to rely on clientelistic ties with individual officials to pursue influence and 
preferential treatments.42 Private entrepreneurs can also attempt to join the Party as well as 
state-sponsored political organizations and associations.43 In particular, a large number of 
successful private entrepreneurs have joined China’s legislative bodies, namely the People’s 
Congress and the People’s Political Consultative Conference (PPCC), at both national and 
sub-national levels.44 Since the selections of People’s Congress and PPCC members are 
under the tight control of the Party, membership in these organizations often indicates 
preexisting clientelistic ties between private entrepreneurs and government officials.45 
Informally, business owners can also procure clientelistic ties with powerful officials through 
bribery and cultivating personal friendship, although these informal relationships may be less 
stable and credible than the ones undergirded by formal organizations and institutions.46    
 The real estate boom of the past two decades has turned the land sector into a venue of 
rent seeking by political elites at various levels. Under the current institutional arrangement, 
																																																																		
41 Peter Lorentzen, Pierre Landry, and John Yasuda, “Undermining Authoritarian Innovation: The Power of 
China’s Industrial Giants,” The Journal of Politics 76, no. 01 (2014). 
42 David A. Steinberg and Victor C. Shih, “Interest Group Influence in Authoritarian States: The Political 
Determinants of Chinese Exchange Rate Policy,” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 11 (2012). 
43 Scott Kennedy, The Business of Lobbying in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005). Bruce J. 
Dickson, Wealth into Power: The Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
44 For the economic payoff of joining the national People’s Congress, see Rory Truex, “The Returns to Office 
in a ‘Rubber Stamp’ Parliament,” American Political Science Review 108, no.2 (2014). For politicians to 
nominate businesspeople with whom they have clientelistic ties to become legislators is not unique to China. It 
is also prevalent, for example, in Egypt and Romania. See Lisa Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in 
Mubarak's Egypt; Oleh Protsyk and Marius Lupsa Matichescu, "Clientelism and Political Recruitment in 
Democratic Transition: Evidence from Romania," Comparative Politics 43, no. 2 (2011).  
45 Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2007). 
46 Xin Sun, Jiangnan Zhu, and Yiping Wu, “Organizational Clientelism: An Analysis of Private Entrepreneurs 
in Chinese Local Legislatures,” Journal of East Asian Studies, 14, no. 1 (2014). 
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the local government has a monopolistic authority to convert land from agricultural to 
construction use, to requisition land from local residents, and to lease it to firms for industrial 
or commercial purposes. Since local residents are to a great extent under-compensated, land 
requisition and conversion often create a huge revenue margin, which can be shared between 
local governments and favored businesspeople through manipulated land transactions.47    
SOEs are important rent-seekers in the land market. As of 2010, 21 out of the then 169 
centrally administrated SOEs (central SOEs hereafter) ran real estate businesses with the 
formal approval of the central government. Examples of these SOE developers include Poly 
Group, a giant corporation with close ties to the military, and Overseas Chinese Town 
Holding Company, a real estate corporation headed by the son of a veteran Party leader. 
Additionally, another 78 among the 169 central SOEs also operated real estate projects 
through 227 subsidiaries. Although in 2010 the central government explicitly ordered the 78 
firms to quit the real estate industry, this mandate encountered strong resistance from these 
powerful business groups. It is estimated that more than 200 out of the 227 subsidiaries 
remained in business two years after the insurance of the mandate. These state-owned 
developers are often linked to violations of national land laws and regulations. In an 
interview, I asked a local private developer in Guangdong in 2013 why he did not build more 
profitable luxury detached villas like the developer of a nearby project. His answer was 
simply: “Detached villas are illegal, you know. That developer is a state-owned firm so it can 
do whatever it wants. We simply cannot do the same.” 
																																																																		
47 Sally Sargeson, "Violence as Development: Land Expropriation and China's Urbanization," The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 40, no. 6 (2013). Hongbin Cai, J. Vernon Henderson, and Qinghua Zhang, "China's Land 
Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?," The RAND Journal of Economics 44, no. 3 (2013). 
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Private firms with various political connections with state elites are also important 
participants in the land market. The data I collected suggest that among the 50 largest firms 
listed in Chinese stock markets, 16 are owned or controlled by businesspeople who are 
People’s Congress or PPCC members at national or provincial levels. Media reports on 
land-use violations by private firms with political connections are abundant. For example, Bo 
Xilai, a former Politburo member and Party boss in Chongqing, had allowed two firms 
personally connected with him to occupy and use land illegally when he served as Mayor and 
Party Secretary of Dalian.48 More recently, a series of media reports on Gen. Gu Junshan, a 
high-level military official, and Zhou Bin, the son of Zhou Yongkang, a former member of 
the Politburo Standing Committee, have similarly revealed that they directly or indirectly 
helped developers connected through business links to their own family members to illicitly 
occupy land.49  
 It is logical to hypothesize that firms with higher-level political connections may exert 
stronger pressure on the central government’s regulatory agencies. In the following sections, 
I use a case study based on the national regulation of golf course prohibition to test this 
hypothesis. 
 
Golf Courses: A Microcosm of Illegal Land Use in China 
																																																																		
48 One of the two firms is a SOE owned by Dalian municipal government. The other is a private firm owned by 
Xu Ming, a businessman who had tight personal ties with Bo’s family and was subsequently appointed as a 
member of the PPCC standing committee in Liaoning.  
49 Heyan Wang, “Tegao: Gu Junshan zhi Di Gu San de Wangguo” ("Special Report: The Kingdom of Gu San, 
the Brother of Gu Junshan"), Caixin Wang (Caixin Online), Jan, 15 2014. Available at:	
http://china.caixin.com/2014-01-15/100629216.html. Jieqi Luo, “Liu Han yu Zhou Bin de Liangci Shangye 




In January 2004, the central government issued a “Notice on the Suspension of New Golf 
Courses”, a national regulation that prohibited the construction of new golf courses in China. 
According to the notice, “All central ministries and local governments are forbidden from 
approving new golf course projects. All unapproved golf courses under construction should 
be suspended immediately, and all golf courses that have not yet begun construction are not 
allowed to do so.”50 This prohibition has also been reiterated and emphasized in several 
other decrees the central government has issued since 2004, as summarized in Table 1. Top 
leaders of the Party and the government have also expressed the importance of the 
prohibition and called for strict enforcement on several occasions.51  
(Table 1 about here) 
The central government’s major concern behind the regulation was that large stretches of 
land were being grabbed for the development of golf courses, resulting in conflicts between 
local governments and local farming villages. Since the 1990s, the housing reform and the 
emergence of wealthy classes have unleashed a strong demand for high-end properties such 
as villas. Golf courses make these properties more attractive to consumers and investors.52 
Driven by lucrative profits, developers rushed to build golf courses. Local officials are also 
enthusiastic about building golf courses, because these large-scale projects boost land 
revenue, elevate the image of their jurisdictions, and provide corrupt rent-seeking 
																																																																		
50 The General Office of the State Council, 2004, “Notice on the Suspension of New Golf Courses”. 
51 Most notably, Premier Wen Jiabao gave a speech at the National People’s Congress in March 2007, 
emphasizing the need of strictly enforcing land laws and regulations with a special mention of golf courses. 
Party Secretary General Hu Jintao also called for the strict enforcement of land laws and regulations in August 
2011. 
52 Ye Shuli, “Qicheng Gaoerfu Qiuchang Kuisun, Kaifashang Yizai Ladong Zhoubian Fangjia” (“Seventy 
Percent Golf Courses Incur Losses; Developer Aim to Boost the Price of Neighboring Properties”), Meiri Jingji 
Xinwen (National Business Daily), 21 June 2011. 
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opportunities for themselves. Golf courses therefore have mushroomed in China, setting off a 
number of collective protests by dispossessed residents.  
 Despite the multiple campaigns launched by the central government to strengthen 
enforcement and crack down on illegal golf courses, the regulation fails to hit the brake on 
the golf course boom. In 2011, it was estimated that the number of golf courses increased 
from 170 in 2004 to more than 600, and hundreds of more were reportedly under 
construction.53 Apparently, the regulation encountered a serious enforcement problem.  
 Existing research on the weaknesses of law and regulation enforcement in China 
provides an inadequate explanation for the proliferation of golf courses and thus the prevalent 
violations of the national regulation. First, a lack of information by regulatory agencies, a 
widely recognized hurdle to effective enforcement, does not exist in the case of golf 
courses.54 This is largely because the central government has long employed satellite 
technology in the detection of land use violations, and this measure is particularly effective in 
the detection of large-scale violations such as golf courses. As a local official in Beijing 
acknowledged in an interview in 2012, “Of course the central government knows where the 
golf courses are. How could it be possible to conceal such giant projects from the satellite?” 
Second, the lack of enforcement does not simply boil down to the non-compliance of 
local officials. This is because, as demonstrated by some of the cases examined below, the 
central government sometimes punished or even removed the local officials involved in these 
																																																																		
53 “Gaoerfu Qiuchang, zai Jinling xia Shengzhang” (“Golf courses: Growing under Prohibition”) Renmin Ribao	
(People’s Daily), 20 June 2011. 	
54 For examples of information asymmetries between central and local governments and their impacts on 
governance in China, see Mayling Birney, “Decentralization and Veiled Corruption under China’s ‘Rule of 
Mandates’,” World Development 53, no. 1 (2014); Andrew Wedeman, "Incompetence, Noise, and Fear in 
Central-Local Relations in China," Studies in Comparative International Development 35, no. 4 (2001).   
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illegal projects but failed to impose the alleged penalties on the projects themselves. And the 
question remains why, in cases when the central government gets involved, some golf 
courses were dismantled while others were largely unaffected?  
 Third, one might also argue that non-enforcement could result from the structural 
deficiencies of the Chinese bureaucracy. In a seminal work, Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel 
Oksenberg describe China’s bureaucratic system as a highly fragmented one, which leaves 
policy outcomes vulnerable to the manipulation of various government agencies charged with 
the actual implementation and enforcement process.55 Case studies based on various policy 
areas, such as energy, telecommunications, and food and drug safety, have supported this 
argument.56 But bureaucratic fragmentation is unlikely to be the most important reason for 
the failures to enforce the golf course prohibition. Compared with regulatory agencies in 
other policy areas, MLR has been granted more independent authority for enforcement.57 
Even if bureaucratic fragmentation nevertheless plays a crucial role, since institutions reflect 
power relations one needs to ask what kind of power structure underpins the fragmented 
governance system in China and why the government persistently fails to fix this problem.  
Empirical Analysis and Discussion 
In this section, I first use regression models to determine the types of firms that are more 
likely to build illegal golf courses after the promulgation of the prohibition. Then I conduct 
																																																																		
55 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
56 Andrew Mertha, “ ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0’: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process,” 
The China Quarterly, no. 200 (2009); Pearson, “Governing the Chinese Economy: Regulatory Reform in the 
Service of the State”; Waikeung Tam and Dali L. Yang, “Food Safety and the Development of Regulatory 
Institutions in China,” Asian Perspective 29, no. 4 (2005). 
57 Barry Naughton, “The Assertive Center: Beijing Moves against Local Government Control of Land,” China 
Leadership Monitor, no.4 (2007). 
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an in-depth analysis on seven illegal golf courses that had received extensive report in the 
national media and subsequently drawn the attention of land regulators in the central 
government. Because the enforcement actions against the seven golf courses were directly led 
by the MLR, their different outcomes reflect the enforcement behavior of the central 
government.  
 The regression analysis is based on an original data set of the 50 largest real estate 
developers (in terms of firm assets as of 2012) publicly traded in the stock markets of 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. From hundreds of sources including media reports, 
online forums, local government reports, and interviews, I collected data on whether these 
developers have built standard 18-hole or larger golf courses between 2007 and 2012, and if 
so, how many.58 I also collected information on these developers’ political connections, 
measured by their SOE status and, if they are private, by whether they are owned by People’s 
Congress or PPCC members at the national or provincial level.59  
 The data indicates that a majority of these 50 largest developers possess some types of 
political connections. Among them, 11 are central SOEs while another six are provincial 
																																																																		
58 The data set includes only the 50 largest developers due to the difficulty of collecting information on 
developers’ golf course development behaviors. No official statistics exist for illegal golf courses. Many 
developers do not advertise their golf course properties on their websites. This is because, as explained by a golf 
course manager, developers try to keep a low profile to avoid media exposure. Due to the lack of public 
information, I have to search each individual illegal golf course by reading dozens of media reports, forum posts, 
and local government reports, and verified them through Google Earth, telephone interviews and field visits. I 
find no particular reason why the argument would not apply to a larger sample. However, I admit the limitation 
of the current analysis.  
59 I use the year 2007 instead of 2004 as the threshold for two reasons. First, there might be some previously 
approved golf courses that just began construction in 2004 (although it is estimated that only less than twenty 
golf courses were formally approved even before 2004). Typically, the construction period for a golf course 
should last no longer than three years. In other words, we should be highly confident that all golf courses 
opening after 2007 violated the prohibition. Second, choosing 2007 as the threshold also facilitates the 
measurement of political connections, because the two Chinese national legislatures, National People’s 
Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, as well as their provincial counterparts, held 
reelections at 2007. Members elected at 2007 served a five-year term until 2012. 
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SOEs. The CEOs of eight firms were members of the National People’s Congress or the 
national Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), while another eight 
were members of People’s Congresses or PPCCs at the provincial level. The remaining 17 
firms have either no political connections or connections only below the provincial level.  
 A close examination of the data reveals that political connections are indeed decisive 
factors in firms’ decisions to develop golf courses. Between 2007 and 2012, 19 out of the 50 
developers built at least one golf course, thus violating the national regulation. The total 
number of golf courses the 19 developers built was 30. Seven out of the 19 violators are 
central SOEs. Another three are provincial SOEs owned by the Beijing municipal 
government. The remaining nine violators are private firms. Six of these are National 
People’s Congress or CPPCC members, one is a member of the PPCC standing committee at 
the provincial level, and another two seem to have no observable political connections. 
However, one of the two seemingly unconnected firms possesses a purely personal 
connection with members of the top political elite in Beijing.60  
 I ran two regressions to test the impact of political connections on firms’ violations. The 
two dependent variables are whether the firms have built golf courses and the number of golf 
courses they have built. Besides political connections, I also control for some other variables, 
including firm size measured by assets; listing location (Shanghai, Shenzhen or Hong Kong); 
and year of the firms’ initial public offerings (IPO). Firm size is included as a control variable 
																																																																		
60 This listed firm illegally occupied 8000 mu of land to build a real-estate complex with a 45-hole golf course 
in Sichuan province, jointly with a local private firm that held 10 percent of the stock of the whole project. The 
owner of the listed firm is the niece of a former PSC member of the Party. More recently, as media reports about 
the investigation of Zhou Yongkang have revealed, the local private firm is actually closely connected to Zhou 
Bin, the son of Zhou Yongkang. See “Zhou Yongkang de Hong yu Hei.” (“Zhou Yongkang’s ‘Reds’ and 
‘Blacks’.”) Xin Shiji Zhoukan (Century Weekly). Issue 6, 2014.        
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because one might argue that larger firms are more likely to obtain legislative membership 
and at the same time have stronger financial capacity to build costly golf courses. If this is the 
case, the observed correlation between political connections and golf course development 
might be a spurious one. Another potentially confounding variable is foreign ownership. 
Despite the absence of formal decrees, it might be assumed that the regulatory agencies in the 
central government may treat foreign capital differently for the purpose of attracting and 
encouraging foreign investment. To test this possibility, I control firms’ listing locations 
because, for historical reasons, firms listed in the Hong Kong stock market are more likely to 
have foreign backgrounds. I also control for the year of initial public offering as a proxy for a 
firm’s expertise and experience in the real estate industry.  
 In Table 2, the first column reports the results of a logistic model, the dependent variable 
of which indicates whether the firms in question have built golf courses during 2007-2012. 
The second column reports the results of a Poisson model, used to explain the number of golf 
courses a sample firm has built.61 Both sets of results show that political connections at the 
central level, measured by the status of central SOEs and national People’s Congress/CPPCC 
membership, significantly increase a firm’s probability that it has built illegal golf courses. At 
the provincial level, both SOE status and legislative membership have positive effects, 
although only legislative membership achieves statistical significance in the logistic model. 
Substantively, SOE status at central and provincial levels increases a firm’s likelihood of 
building illegal golf courses by 60 and 22 percent, respectively. In contrast, membership in 
national and provincial legislatures increases the likelihood by 81 and 51 percent, 																																																																		
61 The major findings do not change if I use a negative binomial regression instead of the passion regression.  
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respectively. These results confirm the hypothesis that the developers who built golf courses 
have excellent political connections. Those who lack such political capital are less willing to 
violate the prohibition.  
(Table 2 about here) 
Among the control variables, firm size has a negative but insignificant effect, suggesting 
that the availability of financial resources is not as important as the political risk involved. In 
fact, the negative sign of firm size is compatible with a political logic: larger firms are in 
general less willing to violate the prohibition and risk punishment because their leading 
positions in the industry risk more media and public attention than smaller firms. Therefore, 
larger firms are more likely to stay away from the highly uncertain golf course market unless 
reliable protection from high-level political elites is available.62 Finally, neither listing 
location nor the year of initial public offering is significant, suggesting that neither foreign 
capital nor length of a firm’s experience in the industry can explain firms’ willingness to 
participate in golf course development.  
 The regression analysis indicates that firms with higher-level political connections are 
more capable of violating the national prohibition of golf courses. However, the mechanisms 
behind this capability remain unclear. For example, one might contend that politically 
connected firms are simply more successful in bribing local officials in exchange for the 
latter’s support in acquiring land and covering up illegal land use. Or it might be that these 
firms simply have a better understanding of the government’s land regulations, so that they 
know when and how regulators in the central government are more likely to make exceptions 																																																																		
62 Interview with real estate developer in Guangdong, February 2013. 
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and permit their golf course projects. However, the following seven cases suggest that 
political connections with high-level political elites are the most salient factor in the 
development of illegal golf courses.   
 These seven illegal golf courses were included in the central government’s list of “top 
priority cases” of land-use violations, a list established by MLR in 2009 to strengthen 
enforcement and rectify the most serious violations. On a seasonal basis, MLR compiles this 
list, often as a response to extensive media coverage and public attention.63 It then 
supposedly imposes punitive measures on these violations and supervises the dismantling of 
golf courses and the reclaiming of the land occupied. MLR also publicizes the outcomes 
through its official website and regular press conferences. Between 2009 and 2012, 65 
land-use violation cases were listed, involving a total area of 51 thousand mu (3.4 thousand 
hectares) of land. Hundreds of officials at city, county and township levels were punished and 
sometimes removed from office. Seven out of the 65 listed cases are violations of the golf 
course prohibition.64  
 Table 3 provides a snapshot of the seven illegal golf courses on the list of “top priority 
cases”. They are located in seven different provinces, suggesting that violations of the 
prohibition are not bunched in certain localities. They also vary in size, with the two largest 
ones containing 54 and 27 holes respectively and the rest, standard 18-hole courses. The 
developers of these golf courses include both private firms and SOEs and firms doing 
																																																																		
63 The Ministry of Land and Resources, 2011, “Measures on the Publication and Listing of Serious Violations 
in Areas of Land and Natural Resources for Immediate Handling (Guotu Ziyuan Lingyu Weifa Weigui Anjian 
Gongkai Tongbao he Guapai Duban Banfa)”. 
64 Another two cases involve illegal land occupation in the construction of practice ranges rather than standard 
golf courses. Since there is no explicit government regulation on whether practice ranges are allowed, I exclude 
these two cases from the analysis. 
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business in both national and local markets.  
(Table 2 about here) 
The seven illegal golf courses provide valuable information about the politics of 
enforcement in China. As a response to extensive media reports, and to demonstrate its 
authority, MLR spent a lot of administrative resources to investigate and rectify these 
violations. Therefore, there is no chance that these violations were covered up by any 
individual bureaucrat at lower levels. In fact, a mid-level MLR official whom I interviewed 
in Beijing in 2013 implied that the disposition of these “top priority cases” were highly 
politicized and subject to the decisions of national leaders. Moreover, MLR stipulated that all 
seven courses were to be dismantled immediately and the land used for their construction to 
be reclaimed, suggesting that no exceptions were to be made.  
 An interesting diversification emerges when the fates of the seven illegal golf courses are 
examined. The two projects in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang were dismantled immediately 
and thoroughly, while the one in Hebei appeared to be dismantled, but the dismantlement 
turned out to be incomplete since some infrastructure such as the grounds and the roads were 
preserved. In contrast, the two courses in Hunan and Heilongjiang were suspended, but the 
facilities were kept intact, indicating a possibility of reopening in the future. The two projects 
in Yunnan and Guangdong were almost unaffected. They remained in business without even 
temporary suspension. Ironically, the two least affected courses are also the largest among the 
seven, with 54 and 27 holes respectively; their violations are therefore more serious than the 
rest. Why did these otherwise similar violations end up with such different fates? 
 A close examination shows that the political connections of the developers of these golf 
		 	
24 		
courses are a decisive factor behind these varying enforcement outcomes. The two national 
real estate developers, Century Golden Resources Group in the Yunnan case, and Kingold 
Group in the Guangdong case, are both tied to political elites in the central government. The 
President of Golden Resources, Huang Rulun, serves as the vice-chairman of the China 
General Chamber of Commerce, an organization sponsored by the Party. He is also a 
standing committee member of the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese and 
the PPCC in Fujian province. Beyond these organizational ties, Huang also maintains a close 
friendship with at least one former Politburo Standing Committee member, whose career 
experience in Fujian and Beijing overlapped with the development trajectory of Golden 
Resources.66 It should also be noted that in order to nurture and maintain its political 
connections, Golden Resources has spent hundreds of millions of yuan every year on 
donations to various charity organizations sponsored by the Party, a type of expenditure 
necessary for private entrepreneurs to signal loyalty to their patrons in the government.  
 The Chairman of Kingold, Zhou Zerong, is another major developer who possesses 
high-level political connections. Although as an Australian citizen Zhou is not qualified for 
legislative membership, he took a wise detour by building informal ties with powerful 
members of the political elite in the central government. Over the past decade, he has, on 
several occasions, accompanied Chinese leaders in their visits to Australia and hosted major 
Australian politicians in China in the presence of top Chinese officials.68 He was also the 
Chairman of the China Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs Association, a commercial 																																																																		
66 Interview with a real estate sales manager in Yunnan, August 2012; also see Fu Tao and Shen Li, “Shiji 
Jinyuan Tengchong Weigui Zhandi” (“Golden Resources’ Illegal Land Taking in Tengchong”), Xin Shiji 
Zhoukan (Century Weekly). Issue 4, 2011. 
68 Central leaders Zhou has accompanied during visits include Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang, Xu Caihou, Liu Qi and 
Wang Yang.  
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association established by the Party as part of the United Front strategy.69 My interviewees 
in Guangzhou have suggested that he maintains a close relationship with the offspring of a 
veteran leader of the Party, whose family has political power in Guangdong province as well 
as political influence in Beijing and the military.70 
 These political connections at the central level provide the two developers with political 
support. For example, after Golden Resources decided to build its golf-villa complex in 
Yunnan, local officials at prefectural, county and provincial levels received pressure from 
their supervisors. They were asked to help the developer acquire bank loans and land.71 As a 
result, Golden Resources was allowed to use more than five thousand mu of farmland without 
the required formal approval of the MLR. A number of central and provincial officials, 
including the aforementioned former Politburo Standing Committee member, visited the 
project to help “coordinate different local agencies and balance various interests”.72 
After MLR publicized the land-use violation, county-level officials quickly became 
scapegoats. The county’s Party secretary was removed from office, but the project itself 
continued as if nothing had happened. The developer reportedly paid several million yuan as 
a penalty, but the fine is almost nothing compared to the profit the project has made. The 
patronage Golden Resources received from members of the political elite in Beijing has 
enabled it to escape harsher punishment.  
 In contrast, the three illegal golf courses in Hebei, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang lacked 
																																																																		
69 Interview with an Australian scholar in Beijing, March 2013; Wikileaks.org. 2007. “Guangdong Overseas 
Chinese Businessmen’s Association Stands United Front.” 07 July 2007, available at 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/07/07GUANGZHOU851.html. Accessed 12 March 2013. 
70 Interview with a local businessman in Guangdong, February 2013,  
71 Interview with a local official in Yunnan, August 2012. 
72 Interview with a local official in Yunnan. 
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the privileges enjoyed by Golden Resources and Kingold. Two of the three were immediately 
dismantled after being listed as top priority cases, with the land reclaimed by the local 
government for other uses.73 Developers of the three courses have a common characteristic: 
according to existing evidence, all of them are connected with political elites primarily at the 
local (city and county) level. In Inner Mongolia the developer was a mining company that did 
all of its business within the city of Ordos. As a member of the city’s People’s Congress, the 
firm’s owner maintained good relationships with leading city and district officials. Having 
accumulated wealth in mining, the firm began to enter the burgeoning and more profitable 
real-estate market. With the support of local officials, the firm acquired seven thousand mu of 
forestland for the ostensible purpose of environmental and ecological projects, but in fact 
turned it into a golf-villa resort. In exchange, the firm promised to sell some of the villas to 
government-designated customers, primarily government employees, at cost.74 In April 2010, 
a national newspaper reported the land-use violation, prompting MLR’s quick decision to 
select it as a top priority case.75 Facing tremendous political pressure from the central 
government, the firm’s local support quickly collapsed. Career concerns forced local leaders 
to withdraw their encouragement of the project and turn into enforcers. The Party secretary of 
Ordos apologized in an interview, claimed ignorance about the violation, and promised 
stricter enforcement in the future. The golf course was then dismantled and the land was 
reclaimed.  
																																																																		
73 The one in Hebei was probably an exception because while the buildings of the golf course were dismantled, 
land reclamation was reportedly incomplete and superficial. See Li, Guangshou and Chunyan Zhao, “Keyi de 
Fugeng” (“The Suspicious Reclamation”), Meiri Jingji Xinwen (National Business Daily). 3 November, 2011. 
74 Interview with a local businessman in Inner Mongolia, December 2011 
75 Wang, Wenzhi and Bo Xiao. 2010. “Guojia Shengtai Zhili Qu Jing Bianshen Gaoerfu Qiuchang.” (“How did 
an Ecological Area Turn into a Golf Course.”) JingJi Cankao Bao (Economic Information), 8 April.  
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 The fates of the two golf courses in Hunan and Heilongjiang lay between these two 
extremes. They were suspended after MLR’s actions, but the buildings, infrastructure and 
facilities remained intact, and the land for their construction was not retrieved. This means 
that, while the projects suffered significant losses, there remains a chance for them to reopen 
after enforcement weakens and a renewed lobbying effort. In both cases, provincial leaders 
were either directly or indirectly involved. The developer behind the illegal golf course in 
Hunan was a provincial PPCC member76 and also vice-president of the Hunan Chamber of 
Commerce in Yunnan Province, a cross-regional business association with networks in both 
provinces. Because of these organizational ties, his project was selected by the Hunan 
provincial government as a key construction project at the provincial level (shengji 
zhongdian jianshe xiangmu). This status has provided the project with many privileges, 
including bank loans, land and most importantly support from city and county governments. 
Provincial leaders visited the project both before and after MLR publicized its land-use 
violation.77 Despite the temporary suspension, the project reopened quietly one year later. 
The head of the provincial PPCC visited the project after the reopening and played a round of 
golf, making it explicit that the required dismantlement had not been carried out and that this 
noncompliance enjoyed the implicit protection of some provincial-level officials. 
 Similar to the Hunan case, the golf course in Heilongjiang was developed by a firm with 
extensive connections at the provincial level. In fact, the project had been created as part of 
the provincial Party committee’s strategy to promote tourism within the province. Adjacent to 																																																																		
76 Xiangshengbao.com “Deng Futang: Xin Nongcun Jianshe de Xingzhe” (“Deng Futang: An Explorer of the 
New Countryside Construction.”), 14 Feb 2013, available at: 
http://www.xiangshengbao.com/bencandy.php?fid-50-id-7584-page-1.htm. 
77 The official website of the developer indicates that provincial leaders who have visited the project include the 
PPCC president, the vice-Party secretary, the vice-governor and other standing committee members of Hunan. 
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a famous tourist site, the project ranked number one among the twelve projects of “famous 
tourist towns” (lvyou mingzhen) proposed by the provincial Party secretary at the time. To 
respond to the provincial leader’s call, the government of Mudanjiang municipality 
immediately set up a state-owned firm to develop the project, an essential part of which is the 
golf course and the villas surrounding it. A city official I interviewed called the project “our 
provincial Party secretary’s”.78 Local news reports indicated that the Party secretary visited 
the project at least four times. Immediately after MLR listed the project as a top priority case, 
he visited again and asked the local government to “overcome all difficulties” and “continue 
to promote the construction of the project”.79 With the support of provincial leaders, it is 
unsurprising that the golf course was only suspended. With all constructed facilities still in 
place, the golf course can be completed quickly when “the policy environment becomes 
laxer”.80 
(Table 4 about here.) 
 Table 4 shows that there is a strong correlation between developers’ types of political 
connections and the actual outcomes of the central government’s enforcement actions. The 
two firms connected with members of the central political elite obtained the most favorable 
treatment. They paid small fines but successfully avoided harsher punishment or 
dismantlement or suspension. By comparison, firms with provincial or local connections 
were either suspended or dismantled, therefore suffering greater financial losses. This 
difference results from informal interventions by powerful patrons rather than a preexisting 
institutional arrangement. In other words, the regulatory agency in the central government 
																																																																		
78 Interview with a local official in Heilongjiang, October, 2012 
79 Interview with a local official in Heilongjiang. 
80 Interview with a local official in Heilongjiang. 
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should have been able to shut down all of these clearly illegal projects, and its failure to do so 
indicates that the informal influence of high-level political players can indeed prevail at the 
highest level.  
Conclusion 
Rapid economic growth for several decades has led to a widespread belief that the Chinese 
government has adapted to the demands of a modern market economy. However, while 
laudable improvements have been achieved and a regulatory state seems to be emerging in 
many respects,81 significant gaps still exist between formal rules and their actual 
enforcement in a range of policy areas, even after the government has spent tremendous 
efforts to streamline the governance structure and strengthen the regulatory capacity. This 
article focuses on the issue of illegal land use to provide a political explanation for such gaps. 
I argue that besides central-local information asymmetries, fragmentation in the governance 
system, and noncompliance by local officials, the selective enforcement by the central 
government and its regulatory apparatus can also account for gaps in the enforcement of land 
regulations. Unambiguous and serious violations of the national prohibition on the 
construction of new golf courses illustrate the central government’s selective enforcement: 
violators connected with a higher-level political patron faced weaker enforcement. This 
appears to reflect a strategy among government leaders to allow powerful members of the 
elite to distribute patronage in exchange for their political loyalty.  
Besides the fates of golf courses, selective enforcement can also explain the puzzling 
pattern of illegal land use displayed in Figure 1. As the Figure shows, while the number of 																																																																		
81 Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 
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land-use violations significantly declined over the last decade, the average scale of illegally 
used land demonstrated a rising trend. One explanation for this pattern is that larger 
violations are more likely to involve higher-level government actors or business interests 
with higher-level political elites, which enables them to benefit from weaker enforcement. 
 This research also identifies two types of business interests as hurdles to building an 
effective regulatory state in China. One, unsurprisingly, is the cluster of the large, powerful 
state-owned business groups China inherited from its socialist past. The other is a population 
of well-connected private firms that have emerged from the Party’s increasing embrace of the 
private sector. Both types of business actors have formed close and sometimes long-term 
formal and informal connections with officialdom and the families of the ruling Party elite, 
and both tend to rely on this political advantage to pursue their economic interests. Their 
rent-seeking activities are at the expense of not only state resources but also the authority of 
national laws and regulations, and are therefore deleterious to the formation of a fair and 
transparent business environment. This aspect of government-business relations suggests that 
China has, to at least some extent, degenerated from an East-Asian type of developmental 
state, in which the government designs favorable policies to promote economic development, 
into a state characterized by “crony” or “booty” capitalism, in which corrupt political elites 
and predatory business oligarchies collude to maximize their own economic rents.82 This 
finding is also consistent with other scholars’ observations that political corruption and rent 
seeking in China undermine the institutional integrity of the state, and transform China into 																																																																		
82 Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agriculatural Policies; Paul D. 
Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1998); David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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an “outlaw economy” in which “private mafias” earn “great fortunes”.83 
 The finding of this article has important implications for reforms and political 
development in China. After two decades of economic transitions, China’s reforms have 
entered a “deep water zone” (shenshui qu), a metaphor widely used by scholars, 
commentators and even government officials to illustrate the persistent stagnation of reform 
in several key policy areas. Political scientist Pei Minxin describes reform stagnation in 
China as a “trapped transition”, and attributes it to the current political institutions that enable 
elites to reap personal benefits and stall further reforms.84 In the land sector, the rapid 
shrinkage of arable land, soaring housing prices, and the violent conflicts caused by illicit 
land requisition have all contributed to a strong social demand for the correction of the 
irregularities surrounding land use. However, this demand is difficult to meet because the 
land market has become an important source of rents for members of the political elite. Given 
their dependence on the support of this broader elite, central leaders have only limited 
capacities to strengthen the enforcement of land regulations and promote effective land 
governance.  
																																																																		
83 Root Hilton, “Corruption in China: Has It Become Systemic?,” Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996); Yan Sun, 
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Figure 1: Number and Average Scale of Land-use Violations (1999-2011) 
 
















































Table 1: Regulations on the Prohibition of Golf Courses Issued since 2004 
Year Month Department/Ministry of Insurance Title 
2004 Jan State Council 
Notice of the General 
Office of the State 
Council on the 
Suspension of New Golf 
Courses 
2004 Oct State Council 
Decision of the State 





Ministry of Land and Resources 




Catalogue of Restricted 
Uses of Land (2006 
Version) and Catalogue 
of Prohibited Uses of 
Land (2006 Version) 
2009 Aug Ministry of Land and Resources 
Circular of the Ministry 




Promoting the Use of 
Approved but Unused 
Land 
2011 Apr 
National Development and Reform Commission 
Ministry of Supervision 
Ministry of Land and Resources 
Ministry of Environmental Protection 
Circular on Launching 
the National Program of 
Cleaning and Rectifying 
Golf Courses  
2012 May 
Ministry of Land and Resources 




Catalogue of Restricted 
Uses of Land (2012 
Version) and Catalogue 
of Prohibited Uses of 





Table 2: Explaining the Golf Course Development of Listed Developers 
 Any Golf Course 
Logistic Regression 
Number of Golf Courses 
Poisson Regression 
Central SOEs 2.721** 1.277* 
1=yes; 0=no (1.16) (0.74) 
Provincial SOEs 0.920 0.627 
1=yes; 0=no (1.46) (1.16) 
Central Legislators 5.458*** 2.686*** 
1=yes; 0=no (1.81) (0.67) 
Provincial Legislators 2.253* 0.94 
1=yes; 0=no (1.24) (0.84) 
Firm asset as of 2007 -0.00005 -0.00001 
Million Yuan (0.00004) (0.00001) 
Shanghai stock market -1.320 0.06 
1=yes; 0=no (1.15) (0.52) 
Shenzhen stock market 0.481 0.155 
1=yes; 0=no (1.25) (0.49) 
Year of being listed 0.032 0.047 
 (0.08) (0.032) 
Constant -64.997 -95.07 
 (160.84) (65.15) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.347 0.233 
Num. of cases 50 50 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 





Table 3: The Seven Golf Courses Listed as Top Priority Cases 
Case # Date of being Listed Province City Holes Developer Firm Type 
1 2010/05 
Inner 
Mongolia Ordos 18 Yitong Coal Chemicals Local private firm 
2 2010/08 Yunnan Baoshan 54  Golden Resources Group National private firm 
3 2011/01 Hunan Chenzhou 18  Xiaobu Investment 
Development Group 
Local private firm 
4 2011/01 Xinjiang Urumqi 18  Silk Road Sports & Fitness Local private firm 
5 2011/04 Guangdong Guangzhou 27  Kingold Group National private firm 
6 2011/07 Hebei Shijiazhuang 18  Zhongcheng Resort Local private firm 
7 2011/10 Heilongjiang Mudanjiang 18  Mingzhen Real Estate Local SOE 















Table 4: The Enforcement Outcomes of the Seven Golf Courses 
Case # Province Punishment Actual Outcome Firm Type Level of Political Connections 
1 
Inner 
Mongolia Dismantle Dismantled Local private firm City 
2 Yunnan Dismantle In business National private firm Central 
3 Hunan Dismantle Suspended/ 
Returned to business 
Local private firm Provincial 
4 Xinjiang Dismantle Dismantled Local private firm City 
5 Guangdong Dismantle In business National private firm Central 
6 Hebei Dismantle Dismantled Local private firm City 
7 Heilongjiang Dismantle Suspended Local SOE Provincial 
Sources: MLR official website, media reports and the author’s fieldwork 			
